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Resumen
Este trabajo propone un marco de análisis para evaluar la conveniencia de la denominación actual de
la deuda del Gobierno Central de Chile, a través del efecto en el riesgo asociado al resultado fiscal. Se
propone una metodología tipo VaR (Value at Risk) para comparar denominaciones alternativas de
moneda y tasa. Si las correlaciones encontradas entre los principales factores que afectan el resultado
fiscal se consideran a su valor puntual de estimación, el ejercicio sugiere que realizar un swap de las
actuales tasas fijas que paga el Estado por su deuda a tasas Libor o de bonos de gobierno, contribuiría
a reducir considerablemente su volatilidad. El ejercicio recomienda adicionalmente reducir la actual
posición en dólares hacia euros y/o libras. Un análisis estadístico más riguroso que considera la
volatilidad de las correlaciones, sin embargo, recomienda tomar los resultados con mayor cautela.
Abstract
This paper proposes a framework to assess the convenience of the current public debt denomination of
the Chilean Government, through its implications on fiscal budget risk management. A “Value at
Risk” methodology is proposed to compare alternative denominations regarding currency and interest
rate. If the correlations found between the main factors affecting the fiscal result are valued at their
point estimates, the exercise suggests that swapping the current debt denomination in fixed interest
payments to variable payments indexed to Libor or government bond rates would significantly reduce
fiscal results' volatility. The results also point to reduce current currency denomination in US dollars
towards a stronger position in Euros or British Pounds. A more statistically rigorous analysis that
considers the volatility of estimated correlations, however, recommends taking previous conclusions
with caution.
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I.  Introduction
As governments of developing countries manage to control public expenses by establishing criteria
for long-term fiscal sustainability, the natural step forward is to include in the administration of the
aggregate fiscal stance more advanced financial theory tools. In this context, the role of risk
management of public assets and liabilities becomes essential to minimizing the exposure of the
economy in general, and public finances in particular, in the face of the volatility of relevant factors.
This approach is especially important in countries that depend substantially on the commerce of
commodities, where the terms of trade explain a large part of their economic fluctuations.
Although this paper focuses on the Chilean government, its purpose is to provide an analytical
framework that can be easily extended to emerging countries that
a)  carry a big burden in interests accrued to the foreign public debt, and
b) their fiscal income is largely correlated to the price of some exportable or importable commodity,
be it directly through the impact on state owned companies, or indirectly through its correlation
with domestic activity.
Global trends in public debt management criteria
Recognizing the importance of public debt management in the risk exposure of countries at the face
of real and financial shocks, the International Monetary and Financial Committee requested a joint
investigation by the IMF and the World Bank with the objective of proposing a set of debt
management guidelines as an assistance to countries concerned with such issue. The final document
released in November 2002 includes in addition several case studies with examples of measures
taken in this direction by several countries.
Among the observed trends, the study underlines the development in the last 15 years of risk
management criteria in two main areas. The first has an institutional nature, and relates to the
growing decentralization of public debt management away from monetary and fiscal policy,
recognizing at the same time both the importance of attaining a necessary level of coordination and
transparency in objectives, instruments and strategies as conditions for success. In most cases, this
has materialized in the proliferation of self-contained units of debt management inside Finance
Ministries and in more extreme cases the establishment of separate external agencies
1.
The second aspects relates with the replacement of the former criteria of choosing the particular
debt structure which reduced the immediate debt burden with a long term approach, where debt2
designs that protect fiscal balances at the face of external shocks are becoming the norm. Though
for most countries this still means focusing on debt payment itself assessing interest rates risk
imbedded in yield curve movements, in some cases the criteria extends to the joint consideration of
other fiscal accounts that affect public results, and the main macro factors that govern their
movements.
2
It is worth mentioning that this focus, the closest in spirit to the present work, has recently been
considered in the Chilean public debt strategy, as the recent bond issue of January 2004 shows. For
the first time, the issue was placed in floating rate, and as the official Finance Ministry’s statement
points out, one of the main reasons is fiscal immunization in a context of correlated internal
business cycles fluctuations and external interest rates 
3.
The Chilean case
The stochastic component of the revenue of the Chilean Government depends, in a simplified
framework, on the evolution of four main factors: Gross Domestic Product, the international price
of copper, the main exchange rates and the different Libor rates to which its internal debt is linked.
The exercise developed in this paper seeks to assess the convenience of the actual debt
denomination, domestic and international, with the possibility of arranging swap agreements that
modify the current interests payment profile, considering the historical joint evolution of interest
rates and the correlation with the afored-mentioned factors. The evaluation criterion is to minimize
the volatility of the fiscal result, not the volatility of interest’s burden per se, a reasonable objective
function supposition of a government concerned of protecting its potential deficits as a result of
unexpected movements in relevant macro factors
4.
There are two aspects not considered in the paper worth to mention to avoid confusion. One is that,
even though interest rates swaps also affect the expected profile (steepness) of interest payments,
this aspect will be neglected as it depends on current economic conditions and not on long-term
                                                                                                                                                                                
1 New Zealand, Colombia and Poland are illustrate the first type of rearrangements, while Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and
South Africa represent more extreme cases of external agencies.
2 This focus is called “Asset and Liabilities Management (ALM)”. As an example, Portugal considers the evolution of
other macro variables jointly with interests rates burden to assess potential public cash flow volatility. England goes one
step ahead, including the evolution of the consolidated government assets, i. e, the international reserves of the Bank of
England.
3 The official statement can be found in the Finance Ministry’s web page, www.minhda.cl. The structure and levels of
debt included in this paper, though, considers outstanding liabilities as of November 2003.
4 The usual immunization criterion in financial management relates to covering equity valuation in response to risk
factor’s movement, achieved through proper matching of duration and currency between assets and liabilities. For a
Central Government, though, it seems more relevant to avoid “cash flow” mismatches that force new debt issuance in
order to meet planned expenditures.3
structural relations on the variables involved
5. In the same line, risk/return aspects imbedded in debt
contract maturity will be ignored (held constant)
6, as they respond to risk preferences subject to a
different type of analysis.
The work is organized as follows: Section II introduces the main elements needed to perform a risk
assessment analysis of the fiscal position; The methodology used, the main variables of interest in
the Government’s financial results and how they are affected by the risk factors considered. Section
III analyzes the historical volatility and correlations between relevant factors. From these
calculations, current fiscal exposure is computed and compared with the optimal attainable exposure
using alternative debt denominations. Section IV assesses the costs/benefits aspects involved in the
eventual swap arrangement, in an expected utility framework that seeks to quantify the welfare
aspects of the proposal. Section V discuses the main risk scenarios of the recommended
denomination in face of sudden changes of the main correlations. Section VI concludes.
II.  Immunizing Fiscal Results
1.  Risk assessment methodology; “Value at Risk” (VaR)
The VaR methodology can be defined as the answer to the following question: What is the
maximum value that can be lost over a given period, under a certain level of confidence?
This methodology is useful for gauging, with a concrete number, the exposure of a portfolio made
up by several accounts, each of which can be exposed to more than one risk factor. In this specific
case, the VaR will be helpful to measure the impact on fiscal results of the relevant factors’
stochastic behavior. This quantitative criterion will allow for an objective comparison of various
alternative denominations for the public debt.
The methodology consists of the following steps: First, the identification of the main risk factors
affecting the portfolio intended to be immunized. In this case, it is necessary to define the group of
n J ,... 1 =  income statements that depend on a set of  k i ,..... 1 = factors. Second, the measurement of
the response or elasticity of each account to the variations in each factor, and third, the measure of
                                                          
5 External debt burden can be swapped from current fixed to Libor rates. In “average”, such rearrangement consider
equivalent payments (constant net present value), but with a different time distribution. Given the actual expectations of
higher future interests rates, reflected in FRA´s, this decision implies lower payments in the short run, compensated with
higher debt service in the future.
6 Historical issues of Chilean bonds (starting early 1999) have been placed with maturities between 5-10 years.4
historical volatilities and correlations between the various factors involved. Then, each factor’s VaR
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which corresponds to the aggregate effect of one factor through the different  jaccounts, where
i σ stands for the standard deviation of factor i , and  ) 1 ( α − Z is the associated statistic for the desired
confidence level.
Once each factor’s VaR has been estimated, the total VaR for the portfolio (considering the VaRs of
all factors) can be calculated as
2 / 1 T) V  x  P  x  V (                       ) 2 ( = TOT VaR
where matrix V(1 x k ) is the vector of the VaRs of all factors considered, and P (k x  k ) is the
correlation matrix between them.  From this expression it becomes clear that a successful
immunization strategy is one that achieves negative correlations between equal-sign VaRs—and
positive for opposite-sign VaRs—, such that the total VaR is smaller than the sum of individual
VaRs.
2.  Income statements and risk factors
The Central Government of Chile holds to date
7 liabilities that amount to 15.4% del PIB
8. This can
be divided into US$ 5.030 MM and US$6.826 MM of external and internal debt, respectively.
These liabilities imply annual interests burdens of about US$ 450 MM, slightly over  2.3% of total
public expenditures, or 0.6% of GDP.
Table 1 shows the central government’s debt breakdown according to different criteria such as
creditor’s nationality, currency of denomination and reference rate, all at par value (the nominal
value of outstanding payments).
                                                          
7 As of November 2003.
8 All currency transformations used exchange rates as of  Noviember 2003 average (US 1= $625.47 pesos).5
Table 1. Central Government Debt by Category
(in millions of US dollars)
Domestic debt Foreign debt Total
In pesos 742 0 742
In dollars 6,075 3,559 9,634
Yen 0 153 153
Euro 0 457 457
Other currencies 9 863 872
Total 6,827 5,031 11,858
Type of rate US Lib 6M +0.5% Fixed
Nominal cost 1.87% 6.33%
Debt/GDP 8.84% 6.52% 15.36%
Interests/GDP 0.17% 0.41% 0.58%
Source: Dirección de Presupuesto (Dipres), the Finance Ministry’s Budget Division
The table shows the US dollar’s dominant position, with 81.2% of the total. This exposure to
foreign currencies means, directly, that the near 15% appreciation of the domestic currency with
respect to the dollar over the year 2003 will result in an 11% reduction in interests paid.
The profile of interest payments, on the other hand, is mainly pre-established fixed amounts for
foreign debt, but variable for the larger part of the domestic debt. As much as 89% of the latter is
anchored to the six-month Libor rate in dollars plus 50 basis points.  The 13-point drop of this
anchor since last January has resulted in reduced interest payments of US$8 million, close to 2% of
the debt service.
It is therefore clear that the exchange rate and the interest rate are important risk factors behind this
account in the fiscal income statement. It is also necessary, however, to include the other accounts
and their respective risk factors in order to perform an integral risk assessment (see table 2).
Table 2: Central Government; Selected Income Accounts, Fiscal Year 2002
(in millions of US dollars)
Total income 16,199
Current income 15,861
       -Operating income 1,066
       -Social Security  Collection 1,085
       -Net tax income 12,325
       -Copper, net of CCF 555
       -Transfers 137
       -Other income 628
Source: Dipres6
The entries that interest us for the analysis are the ones that can be affected by factors that may be
correlated with variables such as the exchange rate and interest rates. With such criteria, it is
possible to identify net tax income and copper proceedings.
Tax income is explained mainly by the evolution of GDP.  Dipres calculations of the elasticity of
tax collection on output estimate it at 1.05.  Copper proceeds, on the other hand, are related with its
price and with the effective exchange rate used to translate international sales into pesos
9. The
elasticities of copper income with the two factors are 2 with respect to the exchange rate and 2 with
respect to the copper price.
10
Once the relevant accounts in the analysis are identified, the problem is easily understood
intuitively. If the government’s purpose is to reduce the volatility of the income statement in
aggregate terms rather than the volatility of interest payments per se, the debt’s denomination
becomes paramount. Picture, for example, the foreign debt. In this framework, the ideal would be to
have it denominated in a currency that were positively related with GDP, and anchored to a variable
rate with equal sign correlation.  Then, in periods of low output levels, the average debt service
would also be smaller, thus immunizing fiscal results.  This is not possible in the present context of
the foreign debt, subject to a fixed rate. As for domestic debt, currently 89% is dollar denominated
at a variable rate (the US 6-month Libor rate).  From the rate standpoint, this would be desirable if it
were positively correlated with GDP.
III.  Borrowing Possibilities
1.  Description of available choices:
There are a large number of choices for alternative denominations. Regarding currency, the main
options for the foreign debt, sticking to hard currencies, are the US dollar (Dl), the euro (EU), the
yen (Yn) and the British pound (BP), and the Chilean peso and the UF
11 for domestic borrowing.
The interest rate can be fixed (plus a spread) or anchored to a variable reference rate. In this case,
the rate can be of short, medium or long term. Thus, it is possible to choose, for example, to borrow
in yens at the three-month Japanese Libor rate. To restrict the analysis, Libor rates are considered
for each of the aforesaid currencies for terms of 90 days to 12 months, plus the monetary policy rate
                                                          
9 However, the treatment of this account is complicated by the copper compensation fund (CCF). Because
flows to and from the fiscal budget and the CCF are not exactly “current income” but only temporary financing, the
analysis omits this consideration.
10 Own estimates based on CODELCO simulations.
11 UF: “Unidad de Fomento”. Index that evolves according to CPI inflation.7
(MPR) and the average deposit 90-day rate in UF for Chile (TP90UF).  For larger maturities, ten-
year rates of each country’s treasury bonds are selected, and the PRC-8 for Chile.
To check for robustness in the calculations, three periods are considered: 1986-2002, 1994-2002
and 1998-2002. For each sub-period, quarterly, semiannual and annual series are used. The main
correlations found are commented below
12. Appendix 1 shows the respective calculations for
alternative period/frequency results.
a) Exchange rates: generally, the negative correlation is confirmed between GDP and and parities.
For annual series in the full period, the US dollar had the most negative correlation, around -0.74,
followed by the British pound and the euro, with the Japanese yen on the other extreme, the least
correlated currency with domestic output factors. For the price of copper, and consistently with
economic intuition, all parities except the yen show negative and significant correlation.
b) Interest rates: in general, positive and significant correlations are observed with respect to GDP.
Moreover, two regularities occur throughout the various periods and frequencies analyzed: first,
long-term rates have a higher correlation than medium-term ones, and these have a higher
correlation than short-term ones, for all currency examined. Second, the currencies’ ranking remains
almost unchanged, with the 10-year bond in pounds at the top of the list, closely followed by the
same rate in Euros, with coefficients between 0.56 and 0.62.  Domestic rates correlations with GDP
are non-significant in most of the cases.
2.  Results
a)  Present status
The value at risk of the fiscal result with the present debt structure is shown in table 3, and
corresponds to the longer period, annual frequency specification of correlations and volatilities.
                                                          
12 To calculate volatility (st. Dev.) and correlations, the first step was to convert all series in returns rates. Therefore,
“price” variables (exchange rates, copper price, GDP, etc.) were computed as the % variation between periods. Interest
rates were held constant.8
Table 3: Value at Risk of the Present Financial Structure
(in millions of US dollars)
13
Effect of a 1% increase in...
Exposure  GDP  PC  US Yen Euro US libor 6M*
Net tax income 13,328 139.9
Copper proceeds 715 14.3 14.3
Foreign debt 5,031
in dollars 3,559 -2.3
In yen 153 -0.1
In euros 457 -0.3
Domestic debt 6,827
In dollars 6,075 -2.2 -60.8
Total 139.9 14.3 9.8 -0.1 -0.3 -60.8
Factor volatility (%) 3.2 23.1 7.4 14.5 13.4 1.9
Value at risk at 95% 743 543 120 -2 -6 -185
Total VaR 762
* 100 basis point increase.
The first column on the left shows the total value of the main fiscal accounts at stake. The right-
hand side shows the effect of changes in value caused by 1% variations in each risk factor. Each
factor can affect more than one account. An increase in the dollar parity, for example, affects copper
proceeds positively, but it also increases domestic and external debt payments expressed in pesos.
 Total VaR indicates that, if the historical behavior of the relevant factors is considered, fiscal
results can decrease  by a maximum of 762 million dollars, with a 95% confidence.  To give an idea
of the magnitude, this value accounts for around 4% of budgeted fiscal income, or 1% of current
GDP in 2002.
b)  Alternative denomination
To find the optimal finance structure, a VaR minimization problem was posed, which solve for
optimal portfolio weights in each currency for the denomination of domestic and foreign debt, as
well as for the relevant indexation rates. These weights depend on the specification of series used to
calculate correlations and volatilities. The main results are shown in table 4.
                                                          
13 In conformity with the 2003 Budget Law.9
Table 4: Optimal Debt Structure; Weights
Frequency
Period 86-02 94-02 98-02 86-02 94-02 98-02 86-02 94-02 98-02
Foreign debt
In dollars 0.35 0.66 0.58
In yen
In euros 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.42 1.00 1.00
In pounds 0.65 1.00
Domestic debt
In dollars 1.00 1.00
In yen
In euros 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
In pounds 1.00 0.45
en UF
In pesos
Min VaR 650 589 548 327 277 292 101 76 71
Present VaR 764 746 646 353 349 342 108 99 95
Saving % 15% 21% 15% 8% 21% 15% 6% 23% 26%
Present VaR (floating) 691 660 619 330 311 314 102 84 79
Saving % float. rate 9% 11% 4% 7% 11% 8% 5% 15% 17%
 Year Semester Quarter
The table shows the ideal weights with respect to the denomination currency. Although it does not
indicate what rate it must be indexed to, for all series specifications, the positive and significant
correlations between output variables and Libor rates indicate that the entire debt must be indexed
to the government rate (or, by default, to the Libor of longest term available) in the currency
indicated by the table. The exercise shows that the fiscal result’s volatility might be reduced by
swapping the current debt’s denomination through some investment bank. Appendix 2 shows a
simulation of the flows exchanged by the central government and the bank in question. The
expected present value of this exercise equals zero. There is, however, an associated transaction
cost. This cost and the convenience to pay it are estimated in section VI. Besides this caveat, one
might say that the central government’s debt is currently in an inefficient position in the risk-return
spectrum offered by the market, and the volatility of interests paid can be reduced without
increasing their present value.
IV.  Costs and benefits of swap operations
It should be stressed that the purpose of this analysis is to recommend a debt denomination that
allows the government to place its fiscal results as close to the efficient frontier as possible. In a
friction-free world, with efficient markets and perfect competition, this adjustment would be a
triviality, with no costs associated.  In the real world, however, a commission must be paid for all
proposed swaps, which is typically charged as a percentage of the amount swapped under the10
contract. For this reason, it is necessary to quantify the benefits associated to the reduced volatility,
and then compare them with the costs.
 One standard framework for the analysis of this kind of problem involves quantifying the benefit
by proposing a utility function with a decreasing marginal utility with implicit risk aversion.
Assume the following government utility function:
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where terms larger than order two are neglected. This expression can be used to measure the
increase in utility that comes from the reduction in volatility that does not affect the expected value
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* σ  stand for the present variance and the variance proposed through the alternative
debt denomination, while β  represents the authorities’ discount factor.
The swap cost, in turn, is simply a portion of the principal considered in the contract. Informal
estimates on a swapped amount of US$20 million suggest a charge of 20 basis points, which can be
reduced considerably if an amount such as today’s government debt is swapped. To be on the
conservative side, the exercise assumes the mentioned charge. Table 8 below shows the basic
amounts involved in the analysis.11
Table 8: Costs and Benefits of Swap, Central Government
(in millions of US dollars)
Swapped Ammount 11,858
Comission (Basis Points) 20
Cost (annuity) 0.89
Discount Rate 0.95
Fiscal Expenditure (20% GDP) 14,839
Benefit 86-02 94-02 98-02
Uo (current σ) 14,832 14,832 14,834
U1  (minimum σ) 14,833 14,834 14,834
U2 (σ rate swap) 14,832 14,833 14,833
PV (U1-Uo)  24 36 12
PV  (U2-Uo)  9 13 -10
PV (U1-Uo) /GDP 0.03% 0.05% 0.02%
PV (U2-Uo) /GDP 0.01% 0.02% -0.01%
(annual series)
To estimate the swap cost, the 20 basis points were applied to the entire debt of the government, on
an annualized basis that considered the present average cost of debt of 3.76%. To calculate utility,
the base amount was assumed to be the fiscal expenditure, around 20% of GDP, or  0 C in the
notation of the previous section. Utility differentials (expressed in pesos) in this conservative
analysis indicate that benefits can be valued by using a discount rate in the central government’s
utility function of 0.95, that is, in the range from 0.02% to 0.03% of GDP.  If only swapping fixed
rates for variable rates is considered, this increase goes to the -0.01% to 0.02% range, depending on
what correlations are considered more relevant to forecast the future behavior of risk factors.
Although these figures may seem small, there are at least two elements to consider that might make
the proposal more appealing. The first is that the cost of the swap doesn’t apply to a longer-term
analysis, where new debt can be issued from the beginning at a floating rate, so the measure would
be strictly welfare increasing. The second is that, from the more general objective of this paper, the
potential benefits seem rather small for Chile given its modest amount of foreign debt, but could be
much larger for countries where debt payments play a mayor role on fiscal expenditures. Such
welfare increase is sketched in figure 1, in the traditional risk/return space.12
Figure 1: Position of Fiscal Result in the Risk-Return Space
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V.  Risk Scenarios
The first thing to keep in mind before a recommendation of this kind concerns the effect of a
possible change in the correlations between the main risk factors. In some circumstances, if
domestic output begins to be negatively correlated with external rates, then the above measures will
amplify the fiscal result substantially.  However, it should be reckoned that, although in the
beginning of expansionary or contractionary phases domestic rates loose their correlation with
output because of the effects of the stabilizing monetary policy, over the larger part of the cycle
there is positive correlation between output and long-term rates of government bonds at the world
level. The quid of the problem lies, therefore, in identifying scenarios of different correlations
between domestic and external activity, and then weight them by their probability of occurrence.
These main scenarios are:
a)  Domestic boom/ External boom: In this situation, the governments tax revenues and copper
proceeds would both increase, as would the rates charged on its debt. This is an ideal situation
from the immunization perspective: to pay a high debt and receive low returns on assets when
the most important government source of income, GDP, is booming.13
b)  Domestic boom / External stagnation: Here, the low rates charged on the debt would add to the
high tax revenues from domestic activity, partially mitigated by reduced copper proceeds.
Although this situation would amplify the income statement, it would go in the desired
direction.
c)  Domestic stagnation / External boom: This situation has, of course, the reversed implications of
the one above, that is, the proposed indexation to variable rates would enlarge the fiscal deficit.
d)  Domestic stagnation / External stagnation: This is precisely the situation for which this strategy
is conceived; to repay low debt whenever domestic activity generates less fiscal resources.
This simple analysis shows that, in the context of our main recommendation of anchoring to
variable rates, the only worrisome scenario is c). In order to have a back-of-the-envelope
assessment of the relative probability associated to each scenario, appendix 3 shoes a relatively
simple exercise. The Y-axis shows the difference between semiannual (at annualized rates) growth
of the Chilean economy for the 1986-2002 period. The X- axis shows the 10 year average
government bond yield of each associated currency (German data for the Euro) for the same period
and frequency. As the figure shows, the fourth quadrant (scenario c)) has relatively low frequency,
accumulating between 15 - 24% of possible cases, depending the country of comparison. In the
same line of argumentation, appendix 4 computes the correlation, in rolling windows of 4 years,
between annualized quarterly GDP growth between Chile and the respective countries. Such
correlation borders 0,4 in the present for the United Kingdom and the Euro area.
Regarding the future distribution of the scenarios, b) and c) are less likely, for two reasons. First,
domestic output is closely related with (and dependent on) the price of copper, which is high when
world activity rises. Second, a hypothesis sustained by common sense and recent empirical
evidence
14 is that stronger commercial links implied by the several bilateral free trade agreements
entered into by Chile recently will result in a higher correlation between the country’s and
international output.
Finally, it is interesting to formally test the results presented by assessing the stability of the
computed correlations. The VaR approach provides a confidence interval for risk exposure given a
set of correlations, which are assumed as constant parameters. In practice, however, these
correlations are themselves parameters estimated through linear regressions, whose statistical
                                                          
14 See Calderón (2003).14
properties would be interesting to include in the previous analysis. In this respect, two exercises are
presented. The first tests the significance of correlations, both individually and jointly. Appendix 1
shows a summary of the most important correlations, tabulating only those significant at the 5%
level. Underneath the tables the joint correlation analysis is presented, where the null hypothesis is
that the matrix of correlations is equal to the identity matrix. In all specifications, the test rejects the
jointly absence of significant correlations, also at 5% critical value.
The second exercise intends to capture the statistical properties of the estimated correlations for
building significance tests for the estimated VaR itself. Using the Delta method for computing
critical values for specific functions of estimated parameters, it is possible to test whether the
estimated VaRs under current and proposed debt denomination alternatives is statistically different.
Let ) ( ) ( plim β f b f = , where  ) (b f is some function (in this case, the VaR) of the vector of
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where  Γis the  L x 1 vector derivatives of  ) (b f for each of the Lcorrelations considered,  X is the
L LTx  matrix of the data used to estimate these correlations, and  T L n x = . Therefore, the
appropriate t-statistic can be computed with the following formula:
2
) (
           ;
) / 2 (
)) ( ) ( (













where the numerator is the estimated difference of VaR under current and proposed denomination
and the denominator contains the average standard deviation of the estimations of correlations under
both alternatives.
Unfortunately for the pretensions of this paper, the results for this contrast accept the null
hypothesis under all specifications. In the annual, whole sample specification of estimated
correlations, for example, the t-stat for the difference between the actual VaR and the proposed
optimal denomination VaR is just 0.32. This result just reinforces the previous caution argument
about the risk scenarios involved in the presence of unstable correlations. The decision to engage a15
currency or interest rate swap as the one proposed should therefore consider the risks imbedded in
the break of the correlation patterns. It is still under the author's opinion, however, that the
increasing integration trend of the Chilean economy with the world's activity makes a strong case
for the consideration of future debt denominations in the line of the last bond issuance at variable
rates. Moreover, for countries with heavier public debt burdens the potential benefits of applying a
similar evaluation approach might be substantially larger.
VI.  Conclusions
This paper has evaluated the current denomination of the central government debt, focusing on the
immunization of fiscal result. An analysis of the evolution of the main risk factors affecting the
state’s result and its relation with other financial instruments available, allows making certain
assertions regarding the optimal currency denomination:
1. With today’s debt, the fiscal result is exposed, with 95% confidence, to maximum fluctuations of
762 million dollars a year (1.1% GDP). The main reason for such exposure is the variation of the
factors involved, mainly GDP, the copper price, the US six-month Libor rate and the exchange rate.
2. Although a large part of this exposure is due to factors exogenous to the debt structure, if the
main correlations between activity, interest rates and currencies are taken at their point estimates, an
optimal financial restructuring would allow reducing it by some 7%-22%, depending on the horizon
and frequency considered calculating the key correlations. Such restructuring should include swaps
of currencies and rates, of both the external debt and internal debt, so that the burden of the foreign
debt would be positively related with the evolution of economic activity and the price of copper. A
conservative cost/benefit analysis in the risk/return spectrum suggests that the net present value of
the gain in utility from the proposal, while relatively modest for the Chilean case, is positive in most
scenarios.
3. Although the optimal proposal varies depending on the data specification chosen to calculate the
volatilities and correlations of all factors involved, most of the calculations yield a small number of
candidates: external debt in euros and/or in pounds, anchored to their respective long-term rates. If
the full estimation period is considered, the US dollar also appears as a feasible candidate.
Regarding interest rate denomination, the answer is more clear-cut. Given the positive correlation16
found among all external rates and the main output variables, regardless of the currency
denomination chosen, the external debt should be anchored to the respective long-term government
bond. In fact, it is possible to reduce the bulk of the present exposure by restricting it to the swap of
interest rates only
4. Although the most important correlations were found to be statistically significant, both
individually and jointly, a stricter test performed on the significance of the proposed VaR reduction
casts some doubts about the effectiveness of the measure. The temporal instability problem of
correlations, in the end, reflects in the statistical irrelevance found between the actual and proposed
denomination alternatives. Further conclusions supporting the proposal should then rely on a
subjective revision of the expectations about the future distribution of correlations. The growing
trend in economic cycle integration caused by commercial agreements between trading partners
could eventually make a case in this direction.
5. This framework of analysis might yield interesting results to countries with higher debt burdens,
where volatility of fiscal result is dominated in a higher degree by the behavior of interest rates
payments.17
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Appendix 1
a)  Main Correlations
BP10Y JY10Y EU10Y US10Y PRC8 CHDL CHBP CHJY CHEU PIB PC
BP10Y 1.00 0.95 0.81 0.86 0.35 -0.46 -0.23 -0.13 -0.40 0.37
JY10Y 0.95 1.00 0.93 0.86 0.36 -0.44 -0.23 -0.37 0.37
EU10Y 0.81 0.93 1.00 0.68 0.20 -0.43 -0.26 -0.17 -0.43 0.36
US10Y 0.86 0.86 0.68 1.00 0.39 -0.46 -0.23 -0.14 -0.32 0.38 0.28
PRC8 0.35 0.36 0.20 0.39 1.00 -0.28 -0.20
CHDL -0.46 -0.44 -0.43 -0.46 1.00 0.53 0.46 0.65 -0.19 -0.26
CHBP -0.23 -0.23 -0.26 -0.23 -0.28 0.53 1.00 0.54 -0.29 0.15
CHJY -0.13 -0.17 -0.14 0.46 0.54 1.00
CHEU -0.40 -0.37 -0.43 -0.32 0.65 1.00 -0.22
PIB 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.38 -0.19 -0.29 1.00




BP1Y JY1Y EU1Y US1Y PRC8 CHDL CHBP CHJY CHEU PIB PC
BP10Y 1.00 0.95 0.84 0.85 0.38 -0.56 -0.32 -0.23 -0.47 0.46
JY10Y 0.95 1.00 0.93 0.86 0.39 -0.52 -0.33 -0.42 0.43 0.18
EU10Y 0.84 0.93 1.00 0.70 0.24 -0.56 -0.36 -0.22 -0.54 0.45
US10Y 0.85 0.86 0.70 1.00 0.40 -0.56 -0.28 -0.27 -0.32 0.44 0.40
PRC8 0.38 0.39 0.24 0.40 1.00 -0.39
CHDL -0.56 -0.52 -0.56 -0.56 1.00 0.60 0.52 0.68 -0.41 -0.25
CHBP -0.32 -0.33 -0.36 -0.28 -0.39 0.60 1.00 0.56 -0.63
CHJY -0.23 -0.22 -0.27 0.52 0.56 1.00 -0.30
CHEU -0.47 -0.42 -0.54 -0.32 0.68 1.00
PIB 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.44 -0.41 -0.63 -0.30 1.00 0.23




BP1Y JY1Y EU1Y US1Y PRC8 CHDL CHBP CHJY CHEU PIB PC
BP10Y 1.00 0.96 0.82 0.89 0.38 -0.74 -0.35 -0.76 0.63 0.30
JY10Y 0.96 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.42 -0.71 -0.44 -0.68 0.53 0.32
EU10Y 0.82 0.90 1.00 0.69 -0.73 -0.52 -0.28 -0.72 0.56
US10Y 0.89 0.89 0.69 1.00 0.49 -0.68 -0.65 0.49 0.54
PRC8 0.38 0.42 0.49 1.00 -0.32 -0.53 0.32
CHDL -0.74 -0.71 -0.73 -0.68 -0.32 1.00 0.63 0.54 0.84 -0.75 -0.39
CHBP -0.35 -0.44 -0.52 -0.53 0.63 1.00 0.49 0.36 -0.66
CHJY -0.28 0.54 0.49 1.00 0.53 -0.38
CHEU -0.76 -0.68 -0.72 -0.65 0.84 0.36 0.53 1.00 -0.50 -0.35
PIB 0.63 0.53 0.56 0.49 0.32 -0.75 -0.66 -0.38 -0.50 1.00








BP10Y JY10Y EU10Y US10Y PRC8 CHDL CHBP CHJY CHEU PIB PC
BP1Y 1.00 0.89 0.80 0.78 0.21 -0.50 -0.32 -0.35 -0.41 0.53
JY1Y 0.89 1.00 0.88 0.86 0.20 -0.48 -0.36 -0.22 -0.39 0.56 0.35
EU1Y 0.80 0.88 1.00 0.81 -0.49 -0.36 -0.25 -0.48 0.62 0.33
US1Y 0.78 0.86 0.81 1.00 0.38 -0.52 -0.46 -0.27 -0.27 0.59 0.35
PRC8 0.21 0.20 0.38 1.00 -0.25
CHDL -0.50 -0.48 -0.49 -0.52 1.00 0.86 0.48 0.73 -0.35 -0.30
CHBP -0.32 -0.36 -0.36 -0.46 -0.25 0.86 1.00 0.54 0.36 -0.35 -0.23
CHJY -0.35 -0.22 -0.25 -0.27 0.48 0.54 1.00 -0.24
CHEU -0.41 -0.39 -0.48 -0.27 0.73 0.36 1.00
PIB 0.53 0.56 0.62 0.59 -0.35 -0.35 -0.24 1.00 0.26




BP1Y JY1Y EU1Y US1Y PRC8 CHDL CHBP CHJY CHEU PIB PC
BP1Y 1.00 0.95 0.82 0.78 -0.62 -0.41 -0.48 -0.52 0.58 0.24
JY1Y 0.95 1.00 0.95 0.90 -0.58 -0.42 -0.32 -0.47 0.55 0.51
EU1Y 0.82 0.95 1.00 0.82 -0.63 -0.46 -0.32 -0.58 0.69 0.54
US1Y 0.78 0.90 0.82 1.00 0.39 -0.61 -0.54 -0.32 -0.28 0.62 0.50
PRC8 0.39 1.00 -0.32
CHDL -0.62 -0.58 -0.63 -0.61 1.00 0.85 0.47 0.73 -0.44 -0.29
CHBP -0.41 -0.42 -0.46 -0.54 -0.32 0.85 1.00 0.55 0.35 -0.45
CHJY -0.48 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 0.47 0.55 1.00 -0.27
CHEU -0.52 -0.47 -0.58 -0.28 0.73 0.35 1.00
PIB 0.58 0.55 0.69 0.62 -0.44 -0.45 -0.27 1.00 0.31




BP1Y JY1Y EU1Y US1Y PRC8 CHDL CHBP CHJY CHEU PIB PC
BP1Y 1.00 0.92 0.83 0.82 -0.85 -0.74 -0.64 -0.77 0.87
JY1Y 0.92 1.00 0.91 0.99 -0.78 -0.73 -0.68 0.68 0.49
EU1Y 0.83 0.91 1.00 0.83 -0.82 -0.80 -0.34 -0.75 0.78 0.67
US1Y 0.82 0.99 0.83 1.00 0.46 -0.80 -0.85 -0.48 0.68 0.50
PRC8 0.46 1.00 -0.39
CHDL -0.85 -0.78 -0.82 -0.80 1.00 0.87 0.48 0.82 -0.85 -0.56
CHBP -0.74 -0.73 -0.80 -0.85 -0.39 0.87 1.00 0.57 -0.86 -0.58
CHJY -0.64 -0.34 0.48 1.00 0.35 -0.77
CHEU -0.77 -0.68 -0.75 -0.48 0.82 0.57 0.35 1.00 -0.70 -0.45
PIB 0.87 0.68 0.78 0.68 -0.85 -0.86 -0.77 -0.70 1.00








BP10Y JY10Y EU10Y US10Y PRC8 CHDL CHBP CHJY CHEU PIB PC
BP1Y 1.00 0.33
JY1Y 1.00 0.26 0.78 0.50 0.55 0.62
EU1Y 0.26 1.00 0.50 0.62 0.28
US1Y 0.78 0.50 1.00 0.56 -0.45 0.36 0.48 0.34
PRC8 0.33 0.50 0.56 1.00 -0.27
CHDL 1.00 0.85 0.64 0.65 -0.35
CHBP -0.45 -0.27 0.85 1.00 0.69 -0.34
CHJY 0.64 0.69 1.00
CHEU 0.55 0.36 0.65 1.00 0.37
PIB 0.62 0.62 0.48 0.37 1.00 0.37




BP1Y JY1Y EU1Y US1Y PRC8 CHDL CHBP CHJY CHEU PIB PC
BP1Y 1.00 -0.52
JY1Y 1.00 0.52 0.92 0.43 -0.35 0.68 0.76 0.50
EU1Y 0.52 1.00 0.47 -0.34 0.89 0.57
US1Y 0.92 0.47 1.00 0.54 -0.52 0.52 0.63 0.44
PRC8 0.43 0.54 1.00
CHDL 1.00 0.87 0.63 0.58
CHBP -0.35 -0.52 0.87 1.00 0.69
CHJY -0.52 -0.34 0.63 0.69 1.00
CHEU 0.68 0.52 0.58 1.00 0.42
PIB 0.76 0.89 0.63 0.42 1.00 0.67




BP1Y JY1Y EU1Y US1Y PRC8 CHDL CHBP CHJY CHEU PIB PC
BP1Y 1.00 0.83 -0.56 -0.48 0.50
JY1Y 1.00 0.95 0.68 -0.46 -0.78 0.66 0.54
EU1Y 1.00 -0.47 -0.73 0.83 0.62
US1Y 0.95 1.00 0.69 -0.45 -0.89 0.45 0.67
PRC8 0.83 0.68 0.69 1.00 -0.47
CHDL -0.56 -0.46 -0.47 -0.45 1.00 0.67
CHBP -0.48 -0.78 -0.73 -0.89 -0.47 0.67 1.00 -0.51 -0.45 -0.58
CHJY 0.66 0.45 1.00 -0.79
CHEU 0.54 0.67 -0.51 1.00
PIB 0.50 0.83 -0.45 -0.79 1.00








BP10Y: 10 year government bond, UK
 JY10Y: 10 year government bond, Japan
EU10Y: 10 year government bond, Germany
US10Y: 10 year government bond, UK
PRC 8: Real 8 year Central Bank of Chile bond
CHDL: Exchange Rate; peso/dolar
CHJY: Exchange Rate; peso/yen
CHEU: Exchange Rate; peso/euro
CHBP: Exchange Rate; peso/pound
Cu: Copper price
GDP: Gross domenstic product











































































Swap cash flow simulation
Notional amount: 1.000











5/23/03 62.1 0.0 62.1 0.0 0.0
7/15/03 27.5 11.8 27.5 0.7 12.5
1/15/04 27.5 11.4 27.5 0.7 12.1
7/15/04 27.5 11.9 27.5 0.7 12.7
1/15/05 27.5 14.0 27.5 0.9 14.9
7/15/05 27.5 15.7 27.5 1.0 16.7
1/15/06 27.5 19.2 27.5 1.2 20.4
7/15/06 27.5 20.9 27.5 1.3 22.2
1/15/07 27.5 23.2 27.5 1.4 24.6
7/15/07 27.5 24.5 27.5 1.5 26.1
1/15/08 27.5 26.4 27.5 1.6 28.1
7/15/08 27.5 27.5 27.5 1.7 29.2
1/15/09 27.5 28.8 27.5 1.8 30.6
7/15/09 27.5 29.3 27.5 1.8 31.1
1/15/10 27.5 30.0 27.5 1.9 31.9
7/15/10 27.5 30.3 27.5 1.9 32.2
1/15/11 27.5 31.4 27.5 1.9 33.3
7/15/11 27.5 31.4 27.5 2.0 33.4
1/15/12 27.5 32.1 27.5 2.0 34.1
7/15/12 27.5 32.4 27.5 2.0 34.4
1/15/13 1,027.5 1,033.3 1,027.5 64.1 1,097.4
Present Value 1,192.1 1,192.1
Source: Bloomberg (Asset swap calculator)
Column I shows the actual pre-determined payment schedule contracted by the government for a
particular bond issue. The present value is computed for a 1000 notional amount, discounted to the
3 month US libor plus the Chilean spread, calculated at 104,2 basis points in april 23, 2003. The
swap consists in exchanging with a third party (bank) fixed for variable rates, so the government
receives fixed rate from bank and pays variable.
The payment demanded by the bank is equivalent to the Libor plus Chilean sovereign spread, values
shown in column II. Given that such payments NPV is below the market value of the bond (issued
at a time of higher Chilean spread), the government must pay the difference at the beginning. Such
difference is simulated as a new debt issue (column IV) at variable rates. The strategies´  net24
payments are shown in the last column, whose NPV is (and should be, by construction) equal to the















































































































Frequency UK10Y US10Y EU10Y JP10Y
Boom/High Yield 0.36 0.27 0.24 0.27
Boom/Low Yield 0.06 0.15 0.18 0.15
Recession/High Yield 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.24
Recession/Low Yield 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.33Documentos de Trabajo
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